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Postponing retirement will become increasingly important as a means to increase the 
labor force, its output and old age security, as populations age. Recent research has 
focused on incentives stemming from the social security system that influence the 
worker’s decision to retire. Defined benefit systems (both public and private) often 
contain penalties for postponing access to pensions or continuing to work while receiving 
a pension. In contrast, the tight link between contributions and accumulations and the 
actuarial conversion of accumulations into pensions in privately managed defined 
contribution systems may lead workers to postpone pensions or to continue working after 
withdrawals begin. The experience of Chile, which implemented its new system in 1982, 
offers an opportunity to test if the change in incentives has indeed produced the expected 
change in retirement behavior. Using probit analysis of household survey data from 1960 
to 2002, we estimate the impact of the pension reform on the probability of 1) becoming 
a pensioner and 2) dropping out of the labor force, for older workers. We find strong 
effects of the new system on both propensities, in the aggregate and at the individual 
level after controlling for individual and macro-economic variables. In particular, 
restricted access to early pensions and the exemption of pensioners from the pension 















Do Individual Accounts Postpone Retirement?: Evidence from Chile 
 
Postponing retirement will become increasingly important as a means to increase the 
labor force, its output and old age security, as populations age. We now have evidence 
that workers respond to incentives stemming from social security systems in making their 
retirement decisions. Most defined benefit (DB) plans contain incentives that encourage 
early retirement from the pension system and the labor force (Gruber and Wise 1999 and 
2004). In contrast, the tight link between contributions and accumulations and the 
actuarial conversion of accumulations into pensions in privately managed defined 
contribution (DC) systems may lead workers to voluntarily postpone retirement.  The 
experience of Chile, which changed from a traditional pay-as-you-go DB to a fully 
funded DC system in 1981, offers an opportunity to test if the change in incentives has 
indeed produced the expected changes in behavior. We are not aware of any previous 
studies addressing this impact of the Chilean reform.
i 
The old social security system in Chile was very fragmented by occupation and 
sector, and each sub-system had its own rules. In the largest sub-system, Servicio Seguro 
Social (SSS), the payroll tax for pensions was 23%, with another 10% for other social 
insurance, bringing the total to 33%. Workers were eligible for a generous defined benefit 
after only ten years of contributions.
ii Taking the pension at the first age of eligibility 
usually maximized the present value of lifetime social security benefits because the 
“normal age” pension was never decreased in an actuarially fair manner. Continued work 
in the public sector was not allowed while receiving a pension. Although private sector 
work was usually allowed, it was penalized.  The full contribution rate had to be paid, but 
the incremental benefit was small and sometimes non-existent. For example, in the SSS 
the monthly benefit was 50% of the base wage after 10 years of service and only 1% 
additional for each year thereafter, until a 70% ceiling was reached after 30 years, at 
which point the incremental benefit became 0. In fact, postponed retirement could 
actually reduce the pension, since the wage base was the average of the last 5 years of 
work and wages typically peaked between ages 45-50. Incremental benefits were further 
dampened by the fact that pensions were not automatically indexed for inflation 
(although inflation at times exceeded 100% per year).    3
In contrast, in the new DC system these work disincentives were removed as 
payroll taxes were greatly reduced and benefits were linked to contributions on an 
actuarially fair basis: 
(1) Total payroll taxes for pensions were cut to 12.5-13%; 
(2) Contributions accumulate in the individual’s account, invested in a pension 
fund (AFP) and earn a market rate of return that exceeded 10% real per year, on average, 
for the first two decades of the system; 
(3) Upon retirement, the accumulation is turned into a pension on actuarially fair 
terms, so incremental contributions yield commensurate benefits;  
(4) Accumulations and annuities in the new system are expressed in UF, a price-
indexed currency, so benefits keep pace with inflation; 
(5) At the “normal” retirement age (65 for men, 60 for women) workers can start 
withdrawing regardless of the amount in their accounts. But those who accumulate 
enough to purchase a pension that meets a specified threshold may start withdrawing and 
stop contributing earlier.  
(6) Pensioners can continue to work and are exempt from the pension payroll tax. 
At that point, their net wage rises by as much as 15% (13/87).  
As discussed further below, we would expect the new system to raise the labor 
force participation rates of older workers, through two channels: 
(1) Postponed pensioning. The restrictions on early withdrawal and the actuarial 
adjustments when withdrawals are postponed should decrease age-specific pension 
probabilities. This will indirectly increase work propensities, since nonpensioners are 
more likely to work than pensioners due to liquidity constraints. 
(2) Increased work propensities among pensioners. The absence of penalties for 
continued work, the reduced payroll tax for all contributors and the exemption of 
pensioners from the pension payroll tax should directly increase labor force participation 
rates, especially for pensioners. 
These effects should be larger for workers who were younger on the date of the reform, 
therefore more likely to switch to the new system, and should increase over time as a 
higher proportion of older workers have been in the new system for long enough to take 
its incentives into account in their life cycle planning.    4
Part 1 reviews the literature on determinants of retirement age, in particular on the 
impact of system characteristics, and outlines in greater detail the work and pension 
incentives in the new Chilean scheme. Part II describes our data set and aggregate results 
on the labor supply of older workers and pension probabilities before and after the 
reform.  Part III applies the probit model to estimate the impact of individual, family and 
system characteristics on the probability of becoming a pensioner and dropping out of the 
labor force. We focus on changes in the time trend of participation rates of older workers 
after the reform and changes in the behavior of birth cohorts that reached age 50 after the 
reform, controlling for other changes in the composition of the work force and the 
broader economy. The Conclusion summarizes the lessons for other countries.  
Our main findings: the labor force participation rates of older men rose 
substantially after the pension reform. This effect was strongest among pensioners, aged 
50-65--a response to their exemption from the pension payroll tax. Simultaneously, the   
probability of becoming a pensioner prior to the “normal” age of 65 declined—due to 
tightened eligibility conditions for early retirement.  These effects have been accelerating 
through time and are greater for cohorts that were younger at the date of the reform. This 
sharply contrasts with the rising pension rates and declining labor force participation rates 
among pensioners observed before the reform.  
 
I. What do Theory and Empirical Evidence Suggest about Retirement Choice? 
 
Studies from other countries 
It is ironic that as people are living longer, they are retiring from the labor force 
earlier.  This will have an increasingly negative impact on labor supply, GDP, and the 
financial solvency of social security systems in many countries as populations age. 
During the past decade a large literature has developed to explain the falling labor force 
participation rate among older men and to suggest policy changes that might reverse this 
behavior.  This research has investigated macroeconomic variables such as higher 
incomes that lead workers to afford longer periods of retirement, personal characteristics 
that determine who leaves the labor force early and pension system rules that discourage 
continued work. We focus on the latter question in this paper.  Older workers may be 
more responsive than prime age workers to system incentives because these incentives   5
are often large and older workers have the option of leaving the labor force permanently 
with pension income rather than adjusting their hours of work marginally while still 
dependent on wage income.  
The benchmark study of this topic is by Gruber, Wise and their colleagues (1999 
and 2004). The first volume uses a consistent measure of the incentive to retire early in 
the defined benefit systems of eleven industrialized countries, and analyzes the 
relationship between this incentive and the observed labor force participation rates of 
older men across countries and time.  In most countries studied, the increment to social 
security wealth from an additional year of work is negative long before age 65—it is an 
implicit social security tax—because the increase in future annual benefits does not 
compensate for the lost current year of benefits when retirement is postponed. The second 
volume examines the impact of work incentives at the individual level, using longitudinal 
micro-data within each country, and two additional measures of work incentives are 
defined, based on longer-term returns to work.  Regressions show that the work 
disincentives and the responses to them are large; therefore most people retire as soon as 
they become eligible for a pension; the greater the disincentives facing an individual the 
less likely he is to postpone retirement; people in different cultural settings have very 
similar responses; and the longer-term measures of incentives are stronger than the 
original short-term measure.  The simulated effects of policy reforms on retirement 
choice and labor supply are consistently large. 
Several studies using US data emphasize the impact on labor force participation 
of the income effect stemming from social security wealth and the timing effect 
stemming from early retirement rules, both of which have changed over the past forty 
years. Hurd (1990) underscores the peak in hazard rates at age 62 that appeared after the 
early retirement option was introduced in 1961 (also see Burtless and Moffitt 1986). Hurd 
also argues that increasing social security benefits in the early 1970’s contributed 
substantially to falling labor force participation rates in the 1980’s and 1990’s, through an 
income or wealth effect. However, Burtless (1986), Peracchi and Welch (1992) and Blau 
(1994) conclude that this impact was quite small. Krueger and Pischke (1992) maintain 
that the apparent negative impact of social security wealth on labor force participation 
rates is due to correlated time effects rather than real system effects. They avoid this 
correlation by analyzing the impact on participation for the “notch generation” that   6
retired in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Benefits and social security wealth were 
suddenly and unexpectedly reduced when double-indexing was eliminated in 1977, yet 
participation rates continued to fall, suggesting that the downward trend comes from 
other forces. Gustman and Steinmeyer (1985) simulate the long run response to the 1983 
social security reforms and find a positive effect on full time work beyond age 65, mainly 
due to the increase in the delayed retirement credit—but this is a simulation, not an 
observation.  Anderson, Gustman and Steinmeyer (1999) simulate how behavior might 
have been different in the US with 1969 rules as compared with 1989 rules and find a 
modest effect. In general, the estimated effects in these US studies are modest—but this 
is not surprising in view of the fact that the rule changes have been relatively modest and 
the US system has long been actuarially fair compared with systems in many other 
countries.  
As for other countries: Borsch-Supan (1998 and 1999) looks at Germany and 
several other European countries during 1965-2000. He finds differing and changing rates 
of decline in labor force participation rates of older workers across countries and time, 
which he attributes largely to varying disincentives coming from their pension systems. 
Baker and Benjamin (1999) study the impact of the introduction of early retirement 
options in Canada in the early 1980’s. They find that this option had little impact on labor 
force participation rates—mainly because those who took early retirement would 
otherwise have had low labor force participation rates anyway and worked only 
intermittently prior to retirement. Access to early retirement pensions increased their 
income but changed their behavior minimally as selection rather than incentive effects 
dominated.  In Switzerland (despite a first pillar that nominally does not permit early 
retirement and a second pillar that is DC, hence rewards continued work) the labor supply 
of older men has fallen over the past 15 years. Butler, Huguenin and Teppa (2004) 
attribute this primarily to the maturing of a generous second pillar, which increased the 
pension wealth of many workers beyond the point they would have chosen voluntarily. 
Workers spend this wealth on longer periods of leisure in old age.  In this way, social 
security systems can have a negative effect even in actuarially fair systems.  
This paper analyzes the actual response to changes in the incentives embodied in 
Chile’s new pension system. Most of the studies mentioned above have had the 
advantage of longitudinal data, which we do not have.  But few studies have had the   7
advantage that system incentives have changed so dramatically and that data are available 
for a long period of time to observe the consequences.   
Work and pension incentives in the new Chilean scheme 
Three potentially separable decisions are involved in the choice of retirement age. 
First is the decision about when to stop contributing to the social security system, second 
the decision about when to start withdrawing retirement benefits, and third the decision 
about when to stop work. In principle we could model three separate behavior rules for 
these three decisions:  
1.) Contribute so long as the marginal benefits from incremental contributions  
exceed the consumption or investment benefits that could be achieved with other uses of 
the money; 
2.) Postpone withdrawal so long as saving is desired and the incremental return to 
social security wealth (SSW) exceeds the return that could be earned outside the system; 
3.) Work so long as the incremental benefits from work (primarily wages and 
fringe benefits) exceed the marginal utility of leisure.  
In traditional DB systems, such as those analyzed by Gruber and Wise (1999 and 
2004), these decisions were closely linked by incentives and constraints so a sharp 
distinction is usually not drawn.  Contributions are required so long as the individual 
works, so the work-contribution decision is joint. Usually the net marginal benefit from 
incremental contributions becomes negative in early old age, which leads workers to stop 
working and contributing at the first opportunity--as soon as access to an alternative 
source of income is established.  The rate of return earned on accumulated SSW is 
usually far less than the market rate of return, so withdrawals in the form of a pension  
start as soon as eligibility is established. The pension is the alternative income source that 
enables individuals to stop working and contributing, thereby linking all three decisions 
together. Sometimes this is reinforced by a requirement that benefits are cut for those 
who do work or, even more strongly, by a prohibition on work for pensioners. The 
linkage of these three decisions, together with an early and falling age of eligibility, helps 
explain the declining labor force participation rates of older men in many countries 
during the past 3 decades and the lower participation rates in countries with higher 
implicit tax rates.    8
Prior to 1981 Chile also had a traditional pay-as-you DB system that included 
disincentives to work among older individuals, similar to those found in many European 
countries today. These include: a high contribution rate that was required for all workers; 
eligibility conditions that enabled retirement at an early age, beyond which the expected 
present value of accrued pension wealth would fall; and a failure of incremental benefits 
to keep up with incremental contributions. In the old system, workers had strong 
incentives to start their pensions and to stop working and contributing as soon as possible 
because this maximized the present value of their lifetime net benefits (see endnote 2).  
After 1981 a new system based on defined contributions was instituted in Chile, 
with incentives that were much more pro-work.  The new Chilean system delinks these 3 
decisions. It sets a threshold replacement rate beyond which workers can become 
pensioners if they wish. It allows pensioners to work or not work, and if they work to 
contribute or not contribute, according to their preferences. It also rewards contributions 
and postponed withdrawals on an actuarially fair basis, using market rates. These forces 
should decrease the propensity to start the pension—since postponing is no longer 
penalized--and increase the propensity to work while receiving a pension—since the net 
wage has been increased by removing the mandatory payroll tax for pensioners and by 
lower payroll taxes for everyone.  Both these effects should increase the labor supply of 
older workers. 
Specifically, in the new system: 
(1) Payroll taxes for pensions were cut to 12.5-13%, in contrast to the old rate of 
23% (workers now pay the full contribution while they paid only 7.25% previously);
iii 
(2) Contributions accumulate in the individual’s account, invested in a pension 
fund (AFP), and earn a market rate of return that exceeded 10% real per year, on average, 
for the first two decades of the system;
iv 
(3) Upon retirement, the accumulation is turned into a price-indexed pension on 
actuarially fair terms, so incremental contributions and postponed withdrawals yield 
commensurate benefits;  
(4) Pensioners can continue to work and are exempt from the pension payroll tax. 
At that point, their net wage rises by as much as 15% (13/87). (Because of actuarial 
fairness, only part of the contribution will be considered a tax and the increase in net   9
wage will therefore be less than 15% for most pensioners. Some portion is nevertheless a 
tax due to time preference and inflexibilities discussed below).  
Workers newly entering the labor force were required to join the new system. 
Older workers were given the option to switch, with recognition bonds (bonos) 
compensating them for their contributions to the old system. Switching propensities were 
high and inversely correlated with age. By 1983 77% of all covered workers had 
switched to the new system, including most workers under age 50. (Palacios and 
Whitehouse 1998; Acuna and Iglesias 2001).
v  
Initially pension withdrawals were allowed at age 65 for men, 60 for women. In 
the early years few workers were eligible since most workers older than 55 stayed in the 
old system.
vi  Indeed, the new eligibility rules help explain the age-related switching 
patterns, as male workers in their 50’s or early 60’s who wished to retire before age 65 
could do so only if they stayed in the old system, while younger workers probably had 
little confidence that the insolvent old system would be able to maintain its retirement age 
or benefits, hence switched.  
In 1987 a new regulation was adopted that allowed workers in the new system to 
start accessing their retirement funds early, when their accumulations reached a specified 
threshold. For most of the period analyzed in this study, the threshold was 50% of their 
own average wage and 110% of the minimum pension guarantee (MPG); but in 2004 the 
government decided to increase this gradually to 70% and 150%, respectively.
vii This 
contrasts with the old system, where workers could retire earlier if they had 16 years of 
contributory service in the main private sector plan or 25 years in the public sector plan. 
These new pre-conditions for early retirement were more restrictive than in the old 
system (since it would generally take longer than 16-25 years to attain a 50% replacement 
rate on actuarially fair terms).
viii Additionally, in the new system early retirees were 
eligible only for a reduced MPG, which provided an incentive for low earners to keep 
their money in the system until age 65. Still, early withdrawal is feasible once the pre-
conditions are met. At that point, keeping money in the account and making further 
contributions becomes voluntary. Thus, workers have considerable control over when to 
start withdrawing and when to stop contributing, and their work decision is separable 
from their pension decision.  
Hypotheses about worker retirement behavior   10
Propensity to become a pensioner in the new system. We hypothesize that once 
workers become eligible for pension withdrawal they will continue to keep their money 
in their social security accounts only if the rate of return earned exceeds their marginal 
time preference (i.e. they wish to continue saving), also exceeds what they could earn on 
investments outside the accounts, and this differential is large enough to compensate 
them for the inflexibilities and non-liquidities that they face in the system. These 
inflexibilities limit the way money can be invested and the timing of withdrawals.
ix  This 
is a source of disutility, in particular, to individuals who have little savings outside the 
system and are credit-constrained. We would generally expect such credit-constrained 
individuals to become pensioners and stop contributing as early as they can, unless they 
can earn above-market returns in the social security system.   
The main source of above-market returns in Chile is the tax system: investment 
earnings in the accounts are not taxed and additional contributions are tax-deductible, but 
withdrawals are taxed. These tax incentives are relevant mainly to high earners (who are 
also least likely to be liquidity-constrained) since low and medium earners pay little if 
any income tax. Thus, we predict that most workers will still avail themselves of the 
opportunity to start a pension as soon as possible—the age of withdrawal is mainly 
determined by eligibility rules. Nevertheless, we expect age of pensioning to be delayed 
by the new system, in part because of incentives stemming from actuarial adjustments but 
mainly because of more restrictive eligibility conditions. This delay should come to an 
end around age 65, at which point everyone is eligible to start withdrawing;
x  
Impact of pensions on labor supply: the liquidity effect. We expect that pensioners 
are more likely than nonpensioners to retire from the labor force, as pensioners now have 
access to an alternative source of income—from their social security wealth. A liquidity 
constraint has been removed. In that case, the reduced propensity to become a pensioner 
just predicted should increase the aggregate labor force participation rate of older 
workers—until age 65.  
Impact of payroll tax on work decisions: substitution effects. Both pensioners and 
nonpensioners should have a substitution effect toward work stemming from the closer 
link between benefits and contributions. But a much stronger substitution effect applies 
toward pensioners, who do not have to make any further contributions, in the new 
system. Some pensioners will continue to contribute voluntarily because this entitles   11
them to disability and survivors insurance through a group policy for which they pay 
about 1% of wages each year, which is far less than such insurance would cost on an 
individual basis.  Individuals who place a high value on this insurance and who wish to 
continue saving, will continue contributing. But for the majority, the same factors that led 
them to start withdrawing will also lead them to stop contributing—they prefer to 
consume or to save in a more flexible manner. This exemption from the pension payroll 
tax will increase the net wage of pensioners.
xi The reform should therefore have a much 
larger impact on labor force participation rates of pensioners than nonpensioners.  
Summary of hypotheses. Therefore, we would expect the following impacts on 
work and pension probabilities: 
1.  The reform will postpone age of pensioning, at least until age 65, partly because 
of actuarial adjustments but mainly because of tightened conditions for early 
retirement. 
2.  The reform will increase the labor supply of older workers, both because it  
a.  decreases age-specific pension probabilities, therefore liquid wealth; and 
b.  increases the net wage, especially among pensioners. 
3.  Nonpensioners will have higher work propensities than pensioners because of 
liquidity constraints. But the greatest increase in labor force participation after the 
reform will occur among pensioners, because of their exemption from the pension 
payroll tax. (The implication is that actuarial equivalence of contributions and 
benefits still leaves a substantial tax component). 
4.  These effects should be greater for individuals who were younger on the date of 
the reform, hence more likely to be in the new system. The effects should be 
phased in over time as more workers have time to take its rules into account in 
their life cycle planning.  
The data turn out to be consistent with these predictions. 
II. Data and Aggregate Results 
 
Data 
The key data source for the analysis is the Universidad de Chile Greater Santiago 
Area Encuesta de Ocupación, a household survey representative of the capital city and its 
surrounding metro area, of 2500-3,000 households, that has been collected since 1957,   12
with the latest available data from 2002. This survey is collected four times a year to 
measure the rate of unemployment, but the June survey also contains data on income 
sources, both labor and non-labor.  For all members of the household, we know their 
gender, schooling, marital status and number children, as well as their current wage, 
pension and other income. We link our data set to variables that measure the 
macroeconomic conditions for each year of the survey, such as unemployment or growth 
rates. The chief advantage of these data is that they allow us to construct synthetic 
cohorts and follow their employment and retirement trajectories, both before and after the 
pension reform. To construct these synthetic cohorts we use data on 92,924 males over 
age 30 who were born after 1900 and were observed some time between 1960 and 2002, 
focusing on the subset (37%) who were over age 50 when they were observed. 
This data set, however, has several shortcomings. It is not a longitudinal data set. 
Nor does it give retrospective data on earnings, pension accumulations or age of 
retirement.
xii We do not know whether the pensions are due to normal old age, early 
retirement, disability, survivors, minimum pension guarantee or social assistance. (By 
focusing on men over age 50 we hope to be capturing mainly old age and early retirement 
rather than other pension types)
xiii. We observe the stock of retirees and do not know 
whether they retired this year or previously, under new or old system rules. For workers 
and other nonpensioners we do not even know if they are covered by any system and, if 
so, whether they contributed steadily through their adult lives and are contributing 
currently. Taking the proportion of men age 70-74 who collect pensions as an ultimate 
indicator of coverage, this percentage has been 71-75% since 1981. This suggests that 
among cohorts born after 1907, which includes all post-reform cohorts and some pre-
reform cohorts, coverage was over 70%, but it was lower previously.
xiv  
Since individuals who don’t belong to any system or have only marginal 
affiliation are unlikely to be affected by the reform, our inability to remove them from the 
data set leads to an underestimate of the impact of the reform among those who do 
belong. By definition all pensioners belong, so this underestimate of labor supply effects 
is absent among pensioners. But the understatement does apply to nonpensioners, in 
particular, to very old nonpensioners. This would lead us to expect that our data would 
show relatively little effect on the propensity to work, after age 65 or 70. The fact that 
coverage was lower for very early cohorts also leads us to underestimate the depressing   13
impact of the reform on pension probabilities among those who are covered. If we could 
distinguish affiliates we would find a bigger impact and if coverage rates were to increase 
in the future the total impact of the reform would be greater than our estimates, for these 
reasons.  
A related measurement error occurs due to the absence of information on whether 
workers and retirees are new or old system affiliates. Instead, we make inferences about 
these affiliations based on year of birth or observation. For example, cohorts born before 
1931 were likely to be old system affiliates, and those born after 1931 were more likely 
to become new system affiliates--but the correlation between birth date and affiliation is 
not 100%. The fact that we do not know the individual’s affiliation means that we further 
underestimate the impact of the reform on new system affiliates, especially in the early 
years of the reform and regarding workers who were around age 50 in 1981. It also 
means that we observe a phase-in of the pension reform rather than an immediate full 
impact, as an increasing proportion of workers approaching old age were new system 
affiliates as distance from 1981 grew (see Table 1).  
Fortunately, all these biases lead us to underestimate reform impacts. Any impact 
that we find is probably smaller than the actual behavioral effects. 
Because of the difficulties in pinpointing who is likely to be affected by the 
reform, we model the reform in three different ways: 1) as a change in time trends of 
pension rates and labor force participation rates before and after 1987; 2) a change in the 
behavior of cohorts born after 1931; and 3) year dummies interacted with relevant age 
groups for each year after 1987.  (We use 1987 as the year when change might begin, as 
most workers who were contemplating retirement shortly after 1981 were likely to stay in 
the old system and follow through on their plans). 
Summary of aggregate data 
As a first step, we look at the aggregate data without controlling for individual or 
macroeconomic effects. We (1) create synthetic cohorts of individuals born in the same 
year and follow their labor force participation rates as they age, comparing these aging 
profiles across pre- and post-reform cohorts; 2) observe labor force participation rates by 
age group, as these age groups are observed at different points in time before and after 
the reform; and 3) construct approximate hazard and survival rates curves for the pre- and 
post- reform groups.     14
Differential age-work behavior by cohort.  Table 1 shows several groups of birth 
cohorts, in 5-year groupings, and the age they were in 1981 (the year of the reform) and 
2002 (the last year in our sample).  The first cohort group, born 1916-25, is our “control 
group,” in the sense that they were so close to retirement (or already retired) in the year 
of the reform that they are unlikely to have been affected. The second cohort, born 1926-
30, would show only small effects, as they were 51-55 in 1981, their life plans had 
already been made, and many did not switch to the new system because they planned to 
retire soon. (This means that most individuals observed in our sample beyond age 70 
retired under old system rules). In the next 3 cohort groups we would expect an 
increasing impact of the reform, as they were more likely to have switched and had more 
time to plan in accordance with its incentives. The cohort born 1931-35 could have been 
observed in young-old age (50-64) or old-old age (65 up to 71).  Cohorts born between 
1936 and 1945 are expected to show larger reform effects, but they would appear only in 
the young-old age range, due to the cut-off year in our sample. The final cohort, born 
1946-50, was in the new system for almost all of its working life and barely entered the 
young-old category, in their early 50’s, when our survey data end.    
As expected, the aggregate data show that in prime age all cohorts had very high 
labor force participation rates, exceeding 95%, and these rates fall after 50 for all cohorts. 
However, for the cohorts that reached age 50 after the reform (born after 1931), work 
propensities fall with age at a much slower rate (Table 2 and Figure 1). Consequently, for 
any given age, labor force participation rates of older men gradually increased for 
successive cohorts during the post-reform period, in contrast to the pre-reform period 
when they were decreasing. For example, the participation rate of men age 55-59 was 
70% for the pre-reform cohort born 1921-25.  It then rose to 80% for the first post-reform 
cohort born 1931-35 and 88% for the later post-reform cohort born 1946-50. Among 
pensioners, participation rates were much lower and the changes more dramatic. For the 
same age group, they rose from 16% for the 1921-25 cohort to 33% for the 1946-50 
cohort. 
At the same time, the probability of becoming a pensioner by age 55-59 was 30% 
for the 1921-25 cohort, but fell to 13% for the 1946-50 cohort (Table 2, Figure 2).   Labor 
force participation rates are much higher for nonpensioners than for pensioners (over   15
90% until the early 60’s for nonpensioners). Thus, this shift to later age of pensioning 
accounts for a large part of the observed increase in aggregate work propensities.  
Differential behavior by age groups through time. Similarly, we looked at labor 
force participation rates by age groups observed at different points in time. The work 
propensity of prime age men has been quite stable, at 95-98%, before and after the 
reform. In contrast, labor force participation rates of older men actually declined for 
about 15 years prior to the reform—a phenomenon that has been observed in many 
countries—but this decline came to an end in the mid-80’s, when a sharp increase began 
(Table 3 and Figure 3). This contrast between prime age versus older males lends 
credence to our argument that incentives from the pension system are driving behavior. 
The post-reform increase in work propensities shows up in the 1980’s for the young-old 
(50-64) but by the 1990’s it reaches the old-old (65+) groups.
xv  
Participation rates are substantially lower among pensioners, but pensioners 
experienced the strongest positive effects from the reform (Table 3 and Figure 4). Among 
pensioners age 55-64 the participation rate tripled between 1982 and 2002, whereas 
among nonpensioners labor force participation rates were relatively stable.  As a result, 
the gap in work propensities of pensioners relative to nonpensioners narrowed—pension 
decision became a less close predictor of work decision. For example, a 57-year-old non-
pensioner was 6.4 times as likely to work as a pensioner in 1982-86, but by 2002 this 
ratio had narrowed to 2.2.  
We also observe a postponement of pensioning, starting in the mid-80’s. By 2002 
pension probabilities for ages 50-60 were at a 40-year low. However pension rates for 
workers over age 65 were close to their historic highs, indicating that this is an effect of 
postponement, not reduced coverage (Figure 5). The postponement of pensioning and the 
increased work propensities of pensioners are both strongly consistent with our 
predictions of the impact of the reform. They constitute two channels for the large 
increase in aggregate labor force participation rates already described.  
  Approximate hazard and survival rates, pre and post-reform. To analyze hazard 
and survival rates precisely one must know the individual’s age of retirement and the 
group “at risk” each year, which requires excluding those who dropped out previously. A 
longitudinal data set would allow us to follow this procedure. Unfortunately, our data set 
is cross-sectional, we do not know the date at which individuals retired from the labor   16
market, previous retirees as well as “at risk” workers continue to appear in our sample 
subsequently, and the number observed at each age changes due to random variations in 
the sample and mortality, as well as withdrawals from the labor market and start-up of 
pensions.   
To obtain approximate hazard and survival rates we divide our sample into pre- 
and post-reform groups and arrange each group according to age 30…99 at which they 
were observed. The pre-reform group consists of all cohorts born before 1931 while the 
post-reform groups was born 1931 or later. We treat each group as a synthetic 
longitudinal set. That is, we assume that the difference between people observed at ages t 
and t-1 in the cross-sections is the same as the change that would take place in people 
observed at ages t and t-1 in a cohort.  Following Hurd (1990) and others who have used 
cross-sectional data, we approximate the hazard rate as (lfprt-1-lfprt)/lfprt-1 and the 
unconditional survival rate as (#in labor forcet)/#observationst, where lfpr = labor force 
participation rate and similarly for pension rates.  Since this procedure captures “average” 
pre and post-reform behaviors and ignores time trends that were taking place within each 
group, it understates the actual changes in behavior that were noted above and are further 
analyzed in the next section.  
As expected, in the young-old age groups the hazard of withdrawing from the 
labor force is generally higher and survival rates generally lower pre-reform, with peaks 
of differences occurring at ages 50, 55 and 60 (Figure 6). These were apparently trigger 
points in the old system since they indicated age of eligibility for various types of 
retirement. In the new system such trigger points are less significant. But after age 62, the 
new system begins to exhibit higher hazard rates (this is necessarily so since practically 
everyone eventually stops working). The early years of postponed retirement add up to a 
considerable amount of additional working time, as the labor force participation rates for 
the new system are well above those for the old system until workers reach their late 60’s 
(Figure 7). 
Consistent with previous observations, survival rates in the labor force are much 
higher for nonpensioners (over 90% through age 60), but the rise in survival rates post-
reform are concentrated in pensioners, so the two grow closer together. Specifically, 
survival rates almost double for pensioners, growing by 10-20 percentage points, but only 
2-5 percentage points for nonpensioners (Figures 8 and 9).  We interpret the higher   17
participation rates for nonpensioners as due to their absence of liquid social security 
wealth. Their smaller response to the reform is evidence that 1) their already high 
participation rates leaves little space for further increases, 2) many nonpensioners are not 
covered by the new or old systems and are therefore unresponsive to system change and 
3) a tax component in the payroll tax remains for nonpensioners even though the new 
system is actuarially fair, while pensioners are exempt so face an increased incentive to 
work.  
At the same time, the hazard of becoming a pensioner falls after the reform for 
workers in their 50’s and early 60’s, due to tightened eligibility conditions. Consequently, 
the survival rate as a nonpensioner is higher post-reform until age 65, at which point all 
individuals are allowed to start withdrawing their pensions regardless of amounts in the 
account (Figures 10 and 11).
xvi The higher nonpensioner probability contributes to the 
increased labor force participation among young-old individuals, even though work 




III. Probit Estimation of Retirement and Pension Probabilities 
 
Do other forces besides the pension reform account for these effects—such as 
changing characteristics of the labor force or macro changes in the economy?   
Unemployment rates rose steadily in Chile from the early 1970’s to the mid 1980s, which 
may help account for falling participation rates before the pension reform.  The 
restructuring of the economy that took place during the late 1970’s and early 80’s led to   
a period of prolonged growth that might have encouraged labor force participation after 
the pension reform.  At the same time, schooling levels rose sharply; this might increase 
wage rates, which could increase labor force participation, but could also increase 
pension eligibility, which might reduce participation among older individuals. To 
investigate the relative importance of these factors we use probit analysis to estimate 
retirement and pension probabilities as a function of the social security reform, 
controlling for individual characteristics and macro-economic year effects.     18
Probit analysis predicts the probability of being pensioned or of being out of the 
labor market for the entire stock of older workers and retirees. The stock of retirees 
includes people who never worked and those who worked but retired in past years, as 
well as the new inflow of retirees in the current year.  As discussed in the previous 
section, it includes a mix of people who worked and retired under new and old system 
rules, as well as people who were not affiliated or only marginally affiliated to any 
system. Thus, the following results understate any effects of the reform on new system 
affiliates, although to a lesser extent for younger individuals and as time moves on. 
Despite this understatement and despite the inclusion of individual characteristics and 
macro-economic variables, we find a strong impact of the reform on the pension age and 
labor force participation of older workers. 
Variables 
Our dependent variables are the pension probability (PENPROBi) and the labor 
force participation rate (LFPRi), which we model as a function of individual 
characteristics Xi, time-related macro-economic characteristics (Et) and three alternative 
indicators of reform (R) defined below. Because we are focusing on older workers, 
whose behavior and response to variables may differ from that of younger workers, most 
coefficients are allowed to vary between individuals under and over age 50 and in some 
cases for individuals over age 65. 
LFPRi = LF (Xi, Et,  R)    (1) 
PENPROBi = PEN(Xi, Et,  R)    (2) 
See Table 4 for a summary of the right hand side variables. 
Individual characteristics included in the reduced form analysis are:  
age of individual (continuous variable for workers age 50 and over, with the 
coefficient additionally allowed to vary continuously for age 65 and over). Pension and 
participation probabilities are very stable in prime age. Older age (over age 50) is 
expected to increase pension probability due to greater likelihood that eligibility 
requirements will be met, and to decrease labor force participation rates, due to greater 
probability of being pensioned (hence having an alternative income source) and lower 
productivity. Therefore we start the continuous age variable with age <=50=0, 51=1, etc. 
We also interact dummies indicating those over age 50 or 65 with some of the variables 
mentioned below. We refer to ages 50-64 as the young-old and 65+ as the old-old. (65 is   19
the “normal” pension age at which point everyone is eligible to start withdrawing money 
regardless of size of accumulation, which should increase pension probabilities and 
decrease labor force participation). Unfortunately, our sample has relatively few old-old 
affiliates of the new system, and it is difficult to separate them from the old-old who are 
affiliated to the old system or unaffiliated with any formal system.  
education (dummies for <6 years and >12 years): This is used as a proxy for  
permanent income and wealth. Low earners (with low education) will find it more 
difficult to meet the pre-conditions for early withdrawal of money from their accounts, so 
we expect them to have a relatively low probability of pensioning at young-old age. The 
illiquidity of their social security wealth and the absence of non-social security wealth 
should lead workers with low education to be credit-constrained and to stay in the labor 
force up to age 65. In contrast, the non-pension wealth of those with high education and 
their easier access to a pension should lead them to retire from the labor force early due 
to a liquid wealth effect. But this effect is counteracted by their higher wage rates and, 
after the reform, by the exemption of pensioners from the pension payroll tax—both 
inducing substitution effects in favor of participation. On balance, we expect that 
individuals with high education are more likely to become early pensioners and the 
reform should have a positive impact on their work propensities as pensioners.  
real household income minus the person’s own wage and pension, per capita (we 
transform the nominal value pesos into constant values using the consumer price index): 
Larger incomes from other sources may raise the individual’s tax bracket, hence decrease 
the probability of early pensioning; but it enables the choice of greater leisure financed by 
other sources, hence it may increase the probability of retirement from the labor market. 
marital status and number children under age 18: married men, especially those 
with children, may continue working later because of larger family consumption 
demands. They may also pension later because (1) they are required to purchase a joint 
pension which reduces the amount by about 15% and therefore makes it more difficult for 
them to meet the eligibility conditions for early withdrawal; and (2) the expected value to 
them of disability and survivors insurance is greater than the premium, because of 
community rating.
xvii 
difference between own age and age of spouse: a younger wife may require a 
more extended period of wage income. Additionally, if she works, the husband might   20
postpone his own retirement to coincide with her’s (Coile 2003, Butler, Huguenin and 
Teppa 2004). 
macroeconomic conditions. A leading counter-explanation for changes in 
observed behavior during the 1980’s and 1990’s would be changes in macro-economic 
conditions in Chile, which were large, during 1960—2002.  The country went through a 
period of economic chaos and hyper-inflation during the early 1970’s, high 
unemployment during the late 1970’s, its financial system went through a major 
restructuring in the early ‘80’s, and it enjoyed a period of prolonged growth that included 
a compete business cycle from the mid-80’s through 2002. The existence of a full cycle is 
important as it reduces the correlation between the phase-in of the reform and economic 
growth, and allows us to separate out these effects. We control for these macro-economic 
changes using rate of unemployment, real annual GDP growth and the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter for GDP growth as alternative variables.
xviii We expect pension probabilities to rise 
and labor market participation to fall during downturns in the economy, due to the 
discouraged worker effect, the greater difficulty older workers may experience in 
obtaining new jobs when laid off from their existing jobs, and the greater ease of meeting 
early retirement pre-conditions when periods with 0 wages are averaged into the own-
wage base.  
Pension status and amount. Pension status and amount play an important role in 
this analysis. In the old system pension eligibility created large incentives to collect the 
pension and stop work simultaneously, at an early age. In the new system we expect that 
most workers will also start their pension as soon as possible, but this is likely to occur 
later because of more restrictive early withdrawal provisions. Our probit for the 
probability of pensioning mainly informs us of the characteristics that determine 
eligibility. Pension status and pension amount then enter into the labor force participation 
equation as exogenous variables, and we expect them to have negative signs due to the 
liquid wealth effect. But we expect this sign to be less negative in the new system than in 
the old, because of the substitution effect stemming from the exemption of pensioners 
from the pension payroll tax and the absence of other penalties for work.   
Rising benefits have been given as one explanation for falling participation rates 
in the US (see earlier discussion). In Chile, real pension amounts plummeted during the 
early 1970’s due to hyper-inflation without automatic indexation. But they recovered   21
steadily during the late 1970’s and more irregularly during the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
Cohorts that were born later got larger real pensions. The rise in pension amounts might 
have been expected to decrease labor force participation rates during the post-reform 
period. In that case, rising participation rates in the aggregate would be even more 
surprising.
xix  
Reform indicators. Our main focus is the impact of the pension reform on pension 
probabilities and labor force participation rates.  We measure reform in three alternative 
ways, because of the difficulties discussed above in identifying which individuals are 
covered by the new versus the old systems (versus no system at all). In each case, we 
interact the indicators with pension status to test our hypothesis that the change in work 
incentives was greatest among pensioners. 
1) change in time trends. In some specifications we include a time trend over the 
entire period 1960-2002 (time=year-1960). The impact of the reform is captured simply 
by a change in this time trend starting in 1987 (time87=year-1986). To focus in on older 
workers, we interact the time trend with dummies for those over age 50 and 65, 
respectively. We use 1987 as the first year when the trend might change, because at the 
time of reform (1981-82) workers in their 50’s who planned to retire prior to 1987 would 
have not been able to do so if they switched to the new system.  Since the switch was 
voluntary, workers who planned to retire early would simply have stayed in the old 
system and their behavior would not have been affected. But most younger workers 
switched given their lack of confidence in the sustainability of the old system and we 
expect them to respond to the incentives of the new system.  
In particular, as new system affiliates gradually comprised an increasing 
proportion of young-old individuals, we expect that fewer workers to pension early and 
more to continue working later. Therefore, the time trend in pension probabilities should 
fall and in participation rates should rise, for individuals over age 50.  We expect pension 
probabilities to revert to the original time trend for individuals over age 65, at which 
point everyone is eligible to start withdrawing from their accounts.  We also expect a 
weaker and possibly non-existent effect on labor force participation for individuals over 
65 for several reasons—the sample size of new system affiliates is small, among   
pensioners a higher proportion are likely to be old system affiliates, among   
nonpensioners a higher proportion are likely to be outside any system, and some new   22
system affiliates in this older age category are close to the MPG, which would reduce 
their incentive to work. 
2) Changes in cohort trends.  One problem with using time trends is that some 
older workers observed after 1987 had retired many years before, under the old system—
we wish to exclude these individuals from the reform group but are unable to identify 
them directly.  Another problem is the correlation between time trend and the 
unemployment rate between 1960 and 1987. Although we control for unemployment, it is 
possible that this correlation may have led to an overstatement of the negative impact of 
the system pre-reform and an overstatement of the reversal post-reform.
xx To avoid these 
problems we organize the data by birth cohort, and compare the behavior of cohorts that 
were born before and after 1931. Workers born in 1931 or after were younger than 50 on 
the date of the reform, therefore, they were more likely to switch.  Cohorts (coh) are 
designated continuously by their years of birth, starting in 1900 (if born <=1916, coh=0, 
if born>1916, coh=year of birth-1916).  In this case, we model the impact of reform as a 
change in the coefficient for cohorts born in 1931 and thereafter (if born <=1930, 
coh31=0, if born >1930, coh31=year of birth-1930). Again, we interact cohort with 
dummies for individuals over age 50 and 65. For the reasons given above, we expect the 
cohort trend in pension probabilities to fall and in participation rates to rise, especially for 
coh31*d50.
xxi For all the reasons given above, we expect a weaker and possibly non-
existent effect on coh31*d65. We also expect the reform effect on older workers per 
cohort year to be smaller than that per calendar year, because we are spreading the total  
effect over 22 cohort years (born 1931-52) but only 16 calendar years (observed 1987-
2002). 
3) Year-age dummies. Our third approach to identifying the post-reform group is 
to use a dummy for every year starting in 1987, interacted with the relevant age group of 
older individuals for that year. In 1987 age group 50-60 could have had pension and 
participation probabilities affected by the reform, for 1988 this group expanded to ages 
50-61, and so on to ages 50-75 in 2002. In contrast to the time trend indicator, this 
approach allows the reform impact through time to be non-linear and it excludes age 
groups that are likely old system affiliates. It also allows us to include later cohorts as 
time moves on. We expect these dummies to have a negative impact on pension 
probabilities and a positive impact on work propensities. These effects should become   23
stronger over time as cohorts that were younger at the time of the reform enter old age 
and as relevant sample size of pensioners grows.  
Results--pension probabilities 
We expect reform to have a positive effect on labor supply from two sources: a 
decreased probability of being pensioned and an increased work propensity for 
pensioners. We first look at the factors that influence the probability of receiving a 
pension.  We focus on the population 50+ because pension income at younger ages is 
typically driven by disability, on which we do not have information in this survey.  The 
probit estimates are reported in Table 5. We show two specifications—in which reform is 
captured by time trends and cohort trends, respectively. While the explanatory power is 
small over-all, most of the variables have the expected effects in both equations.   
Not surprisingly, pension probabilities increase substantially with age—by about 
2.7 percentage points per age-year after 50, but slowing down after 65, by which point 
the majority of eligible workers have retired. Pension probabilities are lower for less 
educated older workers (who are less likely to be in the pension system and to be eligible 
for early pensioning). As the labor force became more educated over the past 25 years, 
we would therefore expect pension rates to rise, whereas in reality they fell, leaving a 
larger gap to be explained. Workers with children and with younger wives are less likely 
to pension (but, surprisingly, the presence of a spouse increases pension probabilities, 
perhaps because married workers are more likely to have steady labor market attachment 
with membership in the social security system). Pension probabilities rise during periods 
of unemployment—a 1% increase in unemployment rate increases pension rates by .2-.4 
percentage points.  Thus, the increase in unemployment rates during the 1970’s would be 
expected to increase pension rates by 3-4 percentage points. The unemployment effect is 
somewhat smaller in the equation with time trends as compared with cohort trends, since, 
as noted above, time trends may have picked up some of the unemployment effect in the 
pre-reform period. Other macro indicators were not significant and are omitted from the 
final equations. 
Most important for our purposes, in both cases reform leads to a significant 
reduction in the probability of pension, after controlling for other variables.  The 
incremental reduction per year is larger in the equation with time trends--1 percentage 
points per calendar years as compared with .6 percentage points per cohort year. As   24
discussed above, this is due in part to the larger number of cohort years that are included 
in the reform. Also possibly contributing is the collinearity of time and unemployment in 
the pre-reform period, which produces a positive time trend pre-reform, cancelled out by 
a more negative time trend post-reform. Nevertheless, in both equations the net change in 
pension probabilities per year after the reform, including time and cohort trends, is 
strongly negative--they fell .8-.9 percentage points per year or 14-18 percentage points 
over the entire post-reform period--for young-old workers.  The picture using post-reform 
year-age dummies for the young-old is consistent—the dummies are gradually phased in 
from –8 to –18 percentage points between 1987 and 2000 when controlling for time 
trends, -5 to –13 percentage points when controlling for cohort trend (Table 6).  We get 
conflicting results on whether these effects are stronger, weaker or unchanged, for the 
old-old.  
Results-labor force participation   
Table 7 presents our results on labor force participation rates. Columns 1-3 use 
time trends as the reform indicator, while columns 4-6 use cohort trends as the reform 
indicator. Columns 1 and 4 present the model without any individual or macro economic 
covariates, simply capturing the trends we have already described—falling participation 
rates pre-reform, rising sharply post-reform. Columns 2 and 5 present the model with 
covariates but without any pension variables, while columns 3 and 6 add pension amount 
and interactions effects with pension status before and after the reform.  
  Comparing equations with and without covariates. First, comparing columns 1 
and 4 versus 2 and 5, we see that the explanatory power jumps substantially once 
individual and economic variables are added, especially in the models with cohort trends.  
Moreover the absolute size of the trend effect falls substantially. Apparently changes in   
educational attainment, income and unemployment rates account for much of the 
aggregate time and cohort trends described in the previous section.  But not for all.  
Equations without pension variables. Looking next at columns 2 and 5, all the 
variables discussed above are significant, generally consistent with our expectations, and 
the coefficients usually differ significantly between those under and over age 50.   Each 
year over age 50 diminishes participation rates by more than 1 percentage point. Highly 
educated persons are more likely to work during prime age—apparently the substitution 
effect dominates there—but this effect reverses after age 50—apparently the pension   25
eligibility effect dominates there. Non-pension household income has a small negative 
effect on work propensities, but this effect is cancelled for older workers. As expected, 
having a wife and children increase work propensities, especially during prime age, and 
this effect is strengthened when the age difference from spouse is greater. Real growth 
rate of GDP was practically never significant so we discard it in these specifications. 
Growth rate using the Hodrick-Prescott filter is sometimes significant, it has the expected 
positive sign for the prime age males but is negative for those over age 50; we keep it in 
the equation mainly as a control variable. Each incremental point to unemployment rate, 
in contrast, depresses participation rates by .2-.3 percentage points for older workers.  
Most important for our purposes is the downward time trend and stable cohort 
trend in participation rates for older men under the old pension system, contrasting with 
the upward trend (of .4-.5 percentage points per year) after the reform.  This trend 
remains significant and sizeable even after controlling for individual and macroeconomic 
characteristics.   
Equations with pension variables.  We investigate this effect further in equations 
3 and 6, by introducing pension amount and interactions with pension status. We expect 
that older workers who receive pensions are less likely to work because they have an 
alternative source of income and this is one of the reasons for the negative effect of age 
on participation. The direct negative effect of age should diminish when pension enters 
the equation, because it is partially replaced by the negative effect of pension. We expect 
the negative pension effect to be stronger for larger pensions due to the income effect. 
We also expect that the negative impact of pensioner status on work propensities will 
become smaller after the reform, because workers can take their pensions, continue 
working and stop contributing, thereby increasing their net wage in the new system.  
This is exactly what we find. Introducing pension status into the equation 
increases the pseudo R
2 substantially, from .4 to .53-.56. The pure age effect is cut 
drastically for young-old workers and a wide gap opens between the age-work profiles of 
pensioners and nonpensioners. But the gap narrows sharply after age 65—as most 
pensioners have already stopped working previously while nonpensioners eventually 
catch up. Pension size has a negative effect on work for prime age men but less so for 
older individuals, perhaps because of the strong negative interaction effect of age with 
pension status per se. The direct negative impact of unemployment rate among older   26
workers is also reduced when pension status is in the model—probably because     
unemployment increases pension probabilities and thereby has an indirect negative 
impact on work propensities.   
Most important for our purposes, by interacting pension status with time and 
cohort we are able to disentangle the response of pensioners and nonpensioners to the 
reform. Equations 3 and 6 show that virtually the entire downward trend in participation 
rates of older people before the reform, and even more so the upward trend after the 
reform, was attributable to pensioners. The old system created incentives for pensioners 
to stop work early, while the new system gave them incentives to go on working, and 
they did both. Among young-old pensioners, participation rates rose 2.39 points per 
calendar year and 1.72 points per cohort year as a result of the reform. (see Tables 8A 
and 8B).  In contrast, work habits of old-old pensioners, who were less likely to be in the 
new system, changed much less—as predicted. And work propensities of nonpensioners, 
many of whom are not in any system, actually declined—possibly a response to growing 
incomes during this period. Since highly educated workers are more likely to be in the 
system and pensioned, this also means that the positive labor supply effect was 
concentrated in the group with the highest marginal productivity. 
Year-age dummies.  We examine the year-age dummies to throw further light on 
the rate at which the reform effects were phased in. For each calendar year, starting in 
1987, we take the subset of older workers who might have been affected by the reform—
ages 50-60 in 1987, 50-61 in 1988, and so on up to 50-75 in 2002. Table 9 splits the 
sample into two groups, pension recipients and nonpensioners, and runs the equations 
separately for each group.  The nonpensioner group is much larger although the pensioner 
group includes a disproportionate number of older workers. We use the same control 
variables that were included in all previous runs, including a time or a cohort trend, but 
this time all the coefficients are implicitly allowed to vary for pensioners and 
nonpensioners.  Consistent with previous results, labor force participation falls faster with 
age among pension recipients and is higher among older pensioners with less schooling. 
Also as before, participation rates fall sharply with unemployment—especially among 
pensioners. In fact, in general, coefficients have a much larger absolute value for 
pensioners, perhaps because nonpensioners have less discretion about working, since they 
have no alternative source of income.   27
As we move to the reform effects captured by the dummy variables at the bottom 
of Table 9, it is clear that these effects are significant only among pensioners, and they 
are positive only starting in 1994.  (This is likely due to the very small sample size of 
pensioners in the new system and their confounding with old system pensioners, prior to 
the early 1990’s).  In any case, by 2000, after controlling for economic cycle and other 
important covariates, labor force participation rates among the relevant age group had 




Many countries with aging populations are seeking ways to increase work 
propensities and delay pension propensities of their older workers. Changes in the 
behavior of older workers can have a large impact on total labor supply, especially since 
they are often making an all-or-nothing choice about remaining in the labor force rather 
than marginal adjustments that workers may make at earlier ages. Chile is an unusual 
case in that labor force participation rates of its older workers have been increasing and 
pension probabilities decreasing for the past 15 years. We argue that this is mainly due to 
incentives and constraints stemming from its social security reform. Older workers seem 
more responsive than younger workers to tax rates that reduce net wages, perhaps 
because they have access to an alternative income source in the form of pensions. The 
high implicit tax rates that are created by many systems have been greatly reduced in 
Chile, and older workers have responded by increasing their participation rates.  
We use probit analysis with three alternative reform indicators—time trends, 
cohort trends, and year-age dummies—to analyze pension probabilities and labor force 
participation rates before and after the reform. Pre-reform Chile looked like many 
European countries today—with early and declining age of pensioning and retirement 
from the labor force, due to strong incentives from the old social security system. This 
trend was sharply reversed after the reform. We attribute the increased labor supply of 
older workers to: 1) postponed pension age because of tighter early withdrawal pre-
conditions and actuarial fair linkages between contributions and benefits; and 2) 
increased incentives to continue working even if pensioned, because the new system 
eliminates work penalties that existed previously and exempts pensioners from the 
pension payroll tax. As a result, many pensioners have continued working.    28
The policy lessons for other countries that wish to increase the labor supply of 
their older workers are obvious. Positive effects are likely if they: 
•  Raise the age of normal age for pension withdrawals and eligibility 
requirements for early pensioning; 
•  Give actuarially fair incremental benefits for postponed withdrawals and 
additional contributions.  
•  Exempt older workers from the pension payroll tax, once they have met a 
target replacement rate.  
What is the relative importance of actuarial fairness versus tightened eligibility 
conditions and exemption from the pension payroll tax, in producing these results? We 
don’t know for sure, since we don’t know whether workers start their pensions at the 
earliest eligible age and whether pensioners continue contributing. However, the fact that 
the drop in pension probabilities is most clear-cut before the “normal “ retirement age and 
that pensioners have a much stronger work response to the reform than nonpensioners 
suggests that early retirement constraints and exemption of pensioners from the payroll 
tax play major roles. It is likely that our probit results understate these behavioral effects 
due to our inability to identify individuals who are affiliated to the new versus the old 
systems or not covered by any system at all.  A new retrospective data set has just 
become available that should allow us to probe these issues further.   29
 Table 1: Age of different cohorts at time of reform and end of our sample   
Born in:  Age in 1981  Age in 2002  Expected influence 
of reform 
1916-25  56-65 77-86 negligible;  control 
1926-30  51-55 72-76 small   
1931-35  46-50 67-71 moderate 
1936-40  41-45 62-66 large 
1941-45  36-40 57-61 larger 
1946-50  31-35 52-56 just  starting  to  retire 
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Table 2: Male labor force participation rate and pensions by cohort in our sample 
A. Labor force participation rate among all males 
Born  35 - 39  40 - 44  45 - 49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 74 
<1916    .980 .947 .849 .797 .645 .455   
1916-20  0.982 0.964 0.932 0.871  0.75  0.602 0.369 0.232 
1921-25  0.978 0.963 0.945  0.87  0.697 0.551 0.348 0.281 
1926-30  0.978 0.969 0.953 0.852 0.731 0.605 0.453 0.258 
1931-35  0.981 0.963 0.939 0.844 0.802 0.681 0.474 0.351 
1936-40  0.982 0.967 0.928  0.9  0.839 0.731 0.526   
1941-45  0.977  0.95  0.966 0.916 0.862 0.771       
1946-50  0.975  0.971  0.967  0.938  0.88         
B. Male pension probability  
<1916  NA  0.010 0.056 0.141 0.199 0.296 0.462 0.620 
1916-20  0.009 0.028 0.064 0.123 0.231 0.348 0.605 0.724 
1921-25  0.011 0.032 0.064 0.134 0.298 0.415 0.643 0.712 
1926-30  0.013 0.023 0.052 0.149 0.238 0.374 0.578 0.746 
1931-35  0.008 0.027 0.056 0.151 0.181 0.325 0.573 0.712 
1936-40  0.010 0.017 0.049 0.086 0.173 0.272 0.526     
1941-45  0.009  0.023  0.026 0.08 0.144  0.278         
1946-50  0.005  0.012  0.024  0.062  0.131          
C. Male labor force participation by age and cohorts among pensioners 
<1916  NA  NA  0.392 0.283 0.257 0.195 0.142 0.097 
1916-20  0.667 0.371 0.29  0.224 0.202 0.117 0.122 0.109 
1921-25  0.50 0.393 0.41  0.269 0.164 0.123 0.139 0.124 
1926-30  0.552  0.5  0.435 0.273 0.143 0.137 0.185 0.136 
1931-35  0.529  0.392  0.299  0.228 0.18 0.227  0.252  0.241 
1936-40  0.368 0.333 0.242 0.183 0.347 0.325 0.24   
1941-45  0.176  0.100  0.462 0.33 0.407  0.425     
1946-50  0  0.350 0.500 0.494 0.333       
D. Male labor force participation rate among nonpensioners, by age and cohort 
<1916  NA  0.990 0.980 0.943 0.931 0.834 0.725 0.525 
1916-20  0.985 0.981 0.976 0.961 0.914 0.861 0.748 0.555 
1921-25  0.983 0.982 0.982 0.963 0.923 0.855 0.723 0.667 
1926-30  0.983 0.98 0.981 0.954 0.914 0.885 0.82 0.617 
1931-35  0.985 0.979 0.977 0.954  0.94  0.9  0.773 0.625 
1936-40  0.988 0.978 0.963 0.968 0.942 0.882 0.844   
1941-45  0.984 0.97 0.979 0.966 0.939 0.904     
1946-50  0.98 0.979 0.978 0.968 0.962       
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Table 3: Male labor force participation and pensions by age group in our sample 
A. Labor force participation-all men 
Yr. obs.  40 - 44  45 - 49  50 - 54  55 - 59  60 - 64  65 - 69  70 - 74 
1957-61  0.972 0.959 0.852 0.816 0.657 0.481  0.28 
62-66  0.959 0.927 0.846 0.773 0.622 0.492 0.339 
67-71  0.967 0.945 0.876 0.811 0.681 0.505 0.308 
72-76  0.968 0.951 0.862 0.761 0.624 0.425 0.258 
77-81  0.968 0.939 0.861 0.715 0.642 0.422 0.233 
82-86  0.945 0.928 0.845 0.703 0.539 0.352 0.201 
87-91  0.97  0.957 0.892 0.791 0.591 0.355 0.203 
92-96  0.968 0.968 0.906 0.834 0.677 0.457 0.271 
97-2002  0.966  0.97  0.938 0.863 0.723 0.461 0.287 
B. Pension probability 
1957-61  0.018 0.044 0.119 0.138 0.196 0.317 0.374 
62-66  0.035 0.068 0.148 0.215 0.289 0.387 0.474 
67-71  0.025 0.063 0.125 0.216 0.308 0.419  0.62 
72-76  0.026 0.05  0.13 0.225  0.354  0.538 0.63 
77-81  0.015 0.063 0.155 0.288 0.318 0.537 0.694 
82-86  0.027 0.051 0.153 0.259 0.422 0.626 0.745 
87-91  0.011 0.032 0.096 0.183 0.381 0.629 0.757 
92-96  0.009  0.02  0.081 0.166 0.331 0.579 0.712 
97-2002  0.009 0.024 0.063 0.154 0.285 0.585 0.733 
C. Labor force participation among pensioners 
1957-61  0.348 0.404 0.235  0.22  0.183 0.145 0.066 
62-66  0.333 0.327 0.291 0.232 0.183 0.131  0.11 
67-71  0.549 0.385 0.249 0.305 0.213 0.142 0.112 
72-76  0.396  0.4  0.255 0.215 0.181 0.146 0.102 
77-81  0.308 0.393 0.315 0.176 0.162 0.142 0.102 
82-86  0.13 0.2  0.201  0.14  0.113  0.111  0.09 
87-91  0.444  0.37  0.178 0.155 0.141 0.145  0.09 
92-96  0.333 0.517 0.336 0.259 0.196 0.194 0.122 
97-2002  0.55 0.578 0.46 0.436  0.332  0.236  0.162 
D. Labor force participation among nonpensioners 
1957-61  0.983 0.984 0.936 0.912 0.773 0.637 0.408 
62-66  0.981 0.971 0.943 0.921 0.801 0.719 0.547 
67-71  0.978 0.982 0.966 0.951  0.89  0.766 0.627 
72-76  0.984 0.981 0.952 0.919 0.866  0.75  0.523 
77-81  0.978 0.976 0.961 0.933 0.866 0.747  0.53 
82-86  0.967 0.968 0.962  0.9  0.85  0.753 0.527 
87-91  0.976 0.977 0.968 0.933 0.867 0.711 0.554 
92-96  0.974 0.977 0.956 0.948 0.915 0.818 0.638 
97-2002  0.97  0.98  0.97  0.941 0.879 0.779  0.63   32
Table 4:  Variable Definitions and Sample Means 
 
 
Variables to capture the age profile of participation and pension probabilities 
Age50  Age-50, or 0 if age<50  Varies between 1 and 49 
Age65  Age-65, or 0 if age<65  Varies between 1 and 34 
 
Variables to capture the effect of individual and household characteristics  
Ed6  Dummy=1 if schooling<=6  0.35 
Ed12  Dummy =1 if schooling>=12  0.37 
Hh income  Real household monthly 
income (minus own labor and 
own pension income) per 
capita in 1977 pesos  85.22 
Pen income  Real pension monthly  income 
in 1977 pesos per pensioner  309.22 
Pen  Dummy =1 if individuals 
receives pension  0.14 
#children  # of children younger than 18  1.3 
Spouse present  Dummy=1 if the individual 
has a spouse living in hh  0.79 
Spousal age diff    Own age-spouse age  3.13 
d50  Dummy = 1 if individual is 50 
or older   0.39 
d65  Dummy = 1 if individual is 65 
or older  0.13 
 
Variables to capture macroeconomic effects 
UnE rate  Unemployment rate in %  10.3 
Deviations H-P 
growth rate 
Difference in logs between 
real annual GDP and the 
Hoddrick –Prescott filter.  0.001 
 
Variables to capture the impact of reform 
Time  Year of observation - 1960  Varies between 0 and 42 
Time87  Year of observation - 1986  Varies between 0 and 16 
Coh  Year of birth-1916, or 0 if 
born before 1916  Varies between 0 and 36 
Coh31  Year of birth-1930, or 0 if 
born before 1931 Varies between 0 and 22 
 Year-age 
dummies 
Relevant age group for each 
years 1987-2002   
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 Table 5: dProbit results
a: Pension rates males 50+  pre- and post-reform  









Age50  2.69 2.66 
Age65  -1.45 -0.11** 
Ed6  -6.42 -6.81 
Ed12  0.16** 0.45** 
Hh income  -0.02 -0.02 
#children  -1.87 -1.95 
Spouse present  8.06 7.33 
Spousal age diff   -0.40 -0.43 
UnE rate  0.22 0.43 
Time  0.16  
Time*d65  0.57  
Time87  -1.03  
Time87*d65  0.49  
Coh  -0.17 
Coh*d65  1.04 
Coh31  -0.63 
Coh31*d65  -1.65 
    
observed P  0.35 0.34 
predicted P (at Xbar)  0.32 0.31 
    
Pseudo R
2  0.2 0.2 
# of observations  37,167 34,706 
     a      All coefficients are reported as percentage points 
   
              P values of estimated coefficients are smaller than 0.001 unless indicated otherwise 
*    P value between .05 and .10 
**  P value above .10 (hypothesis of coeff=0 cannot be rejected)    34
Table 6: dProbit results
a: Pension rates males 50+  pre- and post-reform 
Reform Effects are captured by Age-Year Dummies 
 
 Controlling  for 
time trend  
(1) 
Controlling for 
cohort trend  
(1 
Age50  2.76 2.91 
Age65  -1.59 -0.47 
Ed6  -6.52 -6.89 
Ed12  0.29** 0.47** 
Hh income  -0.02 -0.02 
#children  -1.98 -1.94 
Spouse present  7.96 7.46 
Spousal age diff   -0.39 -0.44 
UnE rate  0.07** 0.31 
Time  0.31  
Time*d65  0.38  
Coh   -0.03** 
Coh*d65   0.77 
Reform Effect 
50-60 in 87  -7.61 -4.72 
50-61 in 88  -10.41 -6.95 
50-62 in 89  -10.44 -6.40 
50-63 in 90  -7.86 -3.62 
50-64 in 91  -12.07 -7.54 
50-65 in 92  -15.17 -10.05 
50-65 in 93  -14.88 -9.68 
50-65 in 94  -11.90 -6.04 
50-65 in 95  -13.37 -7.42 
50-65 in 96  -11.32 -5.00 
50-65 in 97  -14.53 -8.29 
50-65 in 98  -16.85 -10.74 
50-65 in 99  -13.35 -8.42 
50-65 in 2000  -18.15 -13.18 
50-65 in 2001  -14.48 -9.17 
50-65 in 2002  -14.13 -8.24 
66+ after 1993  ** ** 
 
    
observed P  0.35 0.34 
predicted P (at Xbar)  0.32 0.31 
    
Pseudo R
2  0.2 0.21 
# of observations  37,167 34,706 
   a         P values of estimated coefficients are smaller than 0.001 unless indicated otherwise 
*    P value between .05 and .10 
**  P value above .10 (hypothesis of coeff=0 cannot be rejected) 
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 Table 7: dProbit results
a: Labor force participation rates,  males 30+  
pre- and post-reform using time trend and cohort trend as reform indicators 




    (2)  
with 
covariates












Age50   -1.40  -0.60   -1.23  -0.23 
Age65   0.18  -0.51   -0.08**  -0.94 
Pen*age50     -1.08      -1.62 
Pen*age65     1.49     2.52 
Ed6   -1.95  -1.71   -1.71  -1.52 
Ed6*d50   5.31  5.70**    4.97  5.26** 
Ed12   2.30  -0.52   2.03  -0.38 
Ed12*d50   -5.71  -5.27   -5.79  -5.18 
Pen income      -0.08      -0.07 
Pen income*d50     0.07     0.06 
Hh income   -0.003  -0.003   -0.003  -0.003 
Hh inc*d50   0.005  0.001**   0.005**  0.002 
#children   0.94  0.79   0.87 0.73 
#children*d50   -0.22**  -0.49    -0.20 -0.50 
Spouse present   11.74  12.93   11.09  12.13 
Spouse*d50   -8.33  -5.76   -8.07  -5.76 
Spousal age diff    0.12  0.15   0.11 0.13 
Spousal age diff*d50   0.14  0.02**    0.12  0.02** 
UnE rate   0.02**  0.13    0.04** 0.13 













Time*d50  -0.92 -0.09  0.32       
Time*d65  -1.37 -0.08  -0.21       
Time87*d50  2.02 0.61  -0.43       
Time87*d65  1.70 -0.23  0.39       
Pen*time*d50     -1.23       
Pen*time*d65     0.90       
Pen*time87*d50     2.81       
Pen*time87*d65     -1.99       
Coh*d50       -1.07 0.02  0.47 
Coh*d65       -2.66 -0.12**  -0.49 
Coh31*d50       2.32 0.34 -0.48 
Coh31*d65       7.18 0.33** 0.65* 
Pen*coh*d50          -1.49 
Pen*coh*d65          1.91 
Pen*coh31*d50         2.20 
Pen*coh31*d65          -2.14 
           
Pseudo R
2  .28 .4  .56 .08 .37  .53 
# of observations  95,385 95,385  95,074 92,924 92,924  92,614 
   a         P values of estimated coefficients are smaller than 0.001 unless indicated otherwise 
*    P value between .05 and .10 
**  P value above .10 (hypothesis of coeff=0 cannot be rejected)    36
 
Table 8A: Time trend: Change per calendar year in participation rates for older 
individuals, before and after reform (based on probit estimates, column 3, Table 7)   
(in percentage points) 
 




Before reform  0.32 -0.92 -1.23 
After reform  -0.11 1.47  1.58 
Net change 
after reform  -0.43 2.39  2.81 
Ages 65+ 
Before reform  0.11 -0.22 -0.33 
After reform  0.07 0.56  0.50 
Net change 
after reform  -0.04 0.78  0.83 
 
Table 8B: Cohort trend: Change per birth year in participation rates for older 
individuals, before and after reform (based on probit estimates, column 6, Table 7) 
(in percentage points) 




Before reform  0.47 -1.02 -1.49 
After reform            -0.01  0.70  0.71 
Net change 
after reform  -0.48 1.72  2.20 
Ages 65+ 
Before reform  -0.01 0.41  0.43 
After reform  0.16 0.65  0.49 
Net change 
after reform  0.18 0.24  0.06 
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Table 9: Probit results
a: Labor force participation rates males 30+ 
Reform Effect captured by age-year dummies on relevant population 









Age50  -0.75 -0.71 -0.36 -0.33 
Age65  ** **  -0.07  -0.09 
Ed6  ** **  -1.28  -1.27 
Ed6*d50  11.66 12.19 1.42  1.30 
Ed12  ** **  0.47  0.54 
Ed12*d50  -7.79 -8.43 -0.33 -0.23 
Pen income   -0.01 -0.01     
Pen income*d50  ** **     
Hh income  0.03 0.04  -0.002  -0.002 
Hh inc*d50  -0.02  -0.03 -0.001 0.000 
#children  1.96 2.07 0.37 0.35 
#children*d50  -1.05 -1.26*  -0.19* -0.19 
Spouse present  8.27 8.70 6.27 5.95 
Spouse*d50  -4.81* -4.79* -1.37  -1.28 
Spousal age diff   ** **  0.06  0.06 
Spousal age diff*d50  ** ** ** ** 
UnE rate  -0.58 -0.61 -0.04 -0.04 
UnE rate*d50  0.32* 0.30* -0.05 -0.004 
Deviations H-P growth rate  ** ** ** ** 
Deviations H-P growth*d50  ** ** ** ** 
Time*d50  **   0.04   
Time*d65  **  **  
Coh*d50   0.06   ** 
Coh*d65   -0.11   ** 
Reform effect 
50-60 in 87  -7.45 -8.02  **  ** 
50-61 in 88  -7.17 -7.78  **  ** 
50-62 in 89  -7.43 -8.10  **  ** 
50-63 in 90  ** ** ** ** 
50-64 in 91  ** **  -1.08  ** 
50-65 in 92  -6.50* -7.16  **  ** 
50-66 in 93  ** ** ** ** 
50-67 in 94  5.77* 5.70  **  1.02 
50-68 in 95  5.65* 5.82  **  0.79 
50-69 in 96  8.33 8.82  -2.21  ** 
50-70 in 97  7.60 8.07  **  ** 
50-71 in 98  5.44* 5.93  **  ** 
50-72 in 99  14.86 16.31 0.89  1.21 
50-73 in 2000  15.12 18.61  **  1.01 
50-74 in 2001  17.03 17.17  **  ** 
50-75 in 2002  15.76 16.64  **  0.89 
        
observed P  0.17 0.18 0.95 0.96 
predicted P (at Xbar)  0.15 0.16 0.98 0.98 
Pseudo R
2  0.09 0.09 0.29 0.25 
# of observations  13,721 12,357 81,353 80,257 
   a         P values of estimated coefficients are smaller than 0.001 unless indicated otherwise 
*    P value between .05 and .10 
**  P value above .10 (hypothesis of coeff=0 cannot be rejected)   38
 
Figure 1: Male labor force participation by age and cohort in our sample 
 
 







































Figure 2: Age-pension profiles by cohort 
 
 






































Figure 3: Male labor force participation rates by age groups over time 
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Figure 5: Pension probabilities by age group over time 
 






































70 - 74  43
Figure 6: Hazard rates of dropping out of labor force were higher pre-reform 
 




























pre- minus post-reform  44
Figure 7: Survival rates in labor force for older workers are higher post reform 
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post- minus pre-reform  45
Figure 8: Survival rates in labor force pre and post-reform,                        
Differences are significant among pensioners    
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nonpension: post-reform  46
Figure 9: Change in labor force survival rates, post minus pre-reform, pensioners 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 02 12 2





















pensioners: post minus pre-reform
nonpens.: post minus pre-reform  47
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Figure 11: Survival rate as nonpensioner is higher post -reform  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i For preliminary descriptive statistics see Edwards and Edwards (2002). Gruber (1997) 
studied the incidence of the payroll tax in Chile. 
 
ii  By 1979 the old system was composed of 32 pension funds with more than 100 
different programs. It is difficult to obtain precise information about all these sub-
systems. These descriptions are based on SAFP 2003, Cheyre 1991 and personal 
communications with Augusto Iglesias, Primamerica. Under the largest sub-system, 
Servicio Seguro Social (SSS) which covered two-thirds of total contributors (mainly blue 
collar), workers were eligible for defined benefits after 10 years of contributions and the 
normal retirement age was 65 for men and 55 for women. However, earlier retirement 
was possible for those with more than 800 weeks of contributions and for the disabled 
(which was liberally defined). In the largest public sector sub-system, Empart, retirement 
age was 65 both for men and women, but those with 25 years of service could retire at 60. 
Other sub-systems (e.g. for the banking industry) had still earlier retirement ages. 
Retirement ages were generally younger prior to parametric reforms in the late 1970’s. 
Lax record-keeping further facilitated early retirement. Although the population in Chile 
was relatively young, early retirement and evasion resulted in a contributor/pensioner 
ratio of 2.2 in 1980, lower than in the US today. Despite the high payroll tax, the system 
was insolvent and 40% of its costs were covered by subsidies from general revenues. 
 
iii In the new system, 10% of wages go into the individual accounts + 2.5-3% are paid for 
administrative costs and disability and survivors insurance. The 2.5-3% add-on varied 
slightly across pension funds (AFP’s) and has fallen over time. In 2002 it was 2.4%, on 
average (SAFP 2003). While employers paid most of the tax in the old system, workers 
paid the entire tax in the new system, an increase from 7.25% to almost 13% of wages. In 
the short run, wages were commensurately increased for workers who switched. We 
don’t know how wages adjusted in the long run. 
 
iv  Taking account of the 2.5-3% of wages that were paid for fees, which did not go into 
the accounts, the rate of return on gross contributions including fees was 7-8% annually 
for workers who retired during this period. 
 
v The transition deficit, due to benefits received by workers who did not switch and 
redemptions of recognition bonds by those who did switch, was covered by the 
government out of general revenues. This financing gap was substantial—averaging 
3.25% of GDP per year during the first 20 years of the system. However, the incremental 
cost was much lower, as the government was already paying close to 3% of GDP to cover 
the large deficits of the old system (SAFP 2003). 
 
vi Almost all pensions drawn in the new scheme during the early and mid-1980’s were for 
disability and survivors’ benefits. 
 
vii Chile offers a minimum pension guarantee (MPG)--about 25% of the average wage--to 
every worker who has contributed for at least 20 years. If a workers’ own pension falls 
below the MPG, the government subsidizes the pension to bring it up to that level, 
providing the individual does not have additional income sources. The subsidy may take   52
                                                                                                                                                 
the form of a top-up to an annuity, or payment of a full pension at the MPG level if the 
individual’s account has been depleted through gradual withdrawals.  
 
viii  For example, a worker who enters the labor force at age 21 and contributes 10% net 
of fees to his account, facing the average wage growth in Chile of 2% annually and 
earning 5% on his investments, will pass the 50% replacement rate point at age 59 
(assuming an expected age of death of 81). This might be considered a “typical” long run 
case.  But if he earns 10% on his account, as occurred during the first twenty years of the 
new system, he will pass the 50% point after 21 years or work, at age 42. The 
replacement rate requirement was just raised to 70% to prevent this outflow from the 
labor force as many workers are now passing the 21-year point. It will take another 5-10 
years before workers reach the 70% point. 
 
ix Investment options are tightly constrained inside the system, and were even more 
constrained in the 1980’s and 1990’s than they are now. Until 2002 individuals had a 
choice of investment manager but virtually no choice of investment strategy. Since 2002 
greater choice of investment options has been allowed but this is still limited to 4 or 5 
portfolios. Workers who wish to put all their money into stocks, for example, are not 
allowed to do so in the system. Payout options are also tightly constrained. Payouts must 
take the form of annuities or gradual withdrawals according to a formula set by the 
regulator. Thus, if an individual wishes to be able to cover emergency or other lumpy 
needs, he must keep some money outside the system.  This particularly applies to credit-
constrained individuals, who cannot borrow against their social security wealth. 
 
x On the one hand, early retirement rules were tighter in the new system than the old. On 
the other hand, early access was facilitated by the high rate of return to retirement 
accounts during the 1980’s and 1990’s, by regulations that allowed the bono to be used 
for meeting the threshold, and by aggressive marketing of annuities by insurance 
companies at the earliest age of eligibility. The majority of the current stock of 
pensioners in the new system are early pensioners but, as we shall show, not as early as in 
the old system and many of them continue to work (for further discussion see James, 
Martinez and Iglesias 2004a and b). 
 
xi Alternatively, pensioners may hold their net wage constant while accepting a lower 
gross wage from their employers, who are therefore more willing to continue employing 
them even if productivity falls due to aging.  
 
xii  Longitudinal data sets have not been available in Chile. However, a new data set has 
just come on line that gives more detailed retrospective data on earnings and will be 
linked to AFP data on contributions and pensions. We plan to analyze these data in the 
future. 
 
xiii  Given age-related disability rates, some of our pensioners will undoubtedly be 
disability pensioners. Most recipients of survivors’ benefits and social assistance benefits 
are women.  Most pensioners will not become eligible for the MPG until they are well 
past age 70. Until that point they will be using up the money in their own accounts or 
living on an annuity which is more than the MPG. But they may be close to the MPG, 
which may influence their behavior.   53
                                                                                                                                                 
 
xivAbout 70% of the labor force contributes at any point in time. The number of affiliates 
exceeds the number of workers in the labor force but a third of all affiliates are not 
current contributors. (Arenas, Behrman and Bravo 2004).  These may be women who 
have dropped out of the labor market, the self-employed who are not required to join the 
system, informal sector workers or pensioners. Since they contribute only sporadically, 
even if they have pensions at the end these pensions will be small. 
 
xv  The increased participation rates over age 65 in the 1990’s, despite the fact that most 
pensioners in this age range retired under old system rules, may be due to the fact that 
they could re-enter the labor market (or even stay in their previous jobs) as an affiliate of 
the new system, receiving the defined benefit from the old system plus the account from 
the new system—which they could not have done before the reform. In this way the 
reform could affect behavior among the very old and among old system retirees. 
 
xvi After age 65 pension probabilities become slightly higher post-reform due to higher 
coverage rates, on average, during the post-reform period 
 
xvii  Upon retirement, married men are required to purchase joint pensions that provide 
60% of the primary benefit to surviving widows. This reduces their own pension by an 
actuarially fair amount, depending on the age of their spouse. Additionally, all 
contributing workers must pay for disability and survivors insurance. Everyone pays the 
same percentage, about .7%, of their wage, for this insurance. Older workers, who have a 
higher probability of disability, and married men, whose wives get survivors benefits, 
receive an expected value that exceeds their premium, while younger workers, singles 
and women, who have no qualifying “survivors”, lose. 
 
xviii The Hodrick-Prescott filter or H-P filter is an algorithm for choosing smoothed values 
for a time series. It produces a smoothed non-linear representation of a time series, one 
that is more sensitive to long-term than to short-term fluctuations. Following is the H-P 
filter compared with ln(real GDP growth) for Chile, 1960-2002. 
Hodrick -Prescott filter and ln(realGDP)
Year
 lGDP  Hodrick-Prescott filter





xix But pension size did not increase as rapidly as wages, so if workers reacted to a target 
wage replacement rate rather than absolute pension size this might have led them to 
continue working after starting their pensions. It is also possible that the increase in   54
                                                                                                                                                 
lifetime wages would have enabled workers to save more and therefore afford to retire 
earlier, even though their pensions did not rise as fast as wages. The median pension in 
our sample rose 25%, the mean pension rose 22%, and the average wage index for the 
economy rose 35% between 1981 and 2002. In contrast, real pension values were more 
volatile but roughly unchanged in value between 1960-61 and 1980-81. Good data on real 
wages are not available prior to the 1980’s.  
 
xx  Unemployment in Chile was 8% in 1960, fell to 3% by 1973 and then rose to 23% by 
1982 and 15% in 1986. Over the period 1960-1986 the correlation between time and 
unemployment was .74. During the post-reform period 1987-2002, unemployment went 
through an entire cycle, falling to 6% by 1995 and then rising to 14% by 2002. The 
correlation over this period was only 31%. It is possible that the high positive correlation 
pre-reform led to an overstatement of negative pre-reform time trends, which in turn 
would have overstated the reversal in time trend that occurred post-reform.. Use of cohort 

















































































xxi  Coh31*d50 refers to everyone who was born in 1931 or after and is observed at age 
50 or after. By definition, all these observations took place after the new system was 
adopted and all these people reached age 50 under the new system, hence could 
reasonably be expected to make their pension and participation decisions in accordance 
with the new system rules. In contrast, time87*d50 refers to everyone who is observed   55
                                                                                                                                                 
beyond age 50 after 1987. This includes people in their 70’s and 80’s who retired many 
years before under old system rules. Therefore, coh31*d50 contains less measurement 
error in targeting the group subject to the new system rules.    
 